



*v. Lappin*, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that “the dismissal standard articulated in *Iqbal* and *Twombly* governs dismissals for failure to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)] because the relevant statutory language tracks the language in Rule 12(b)(6)”).

“Accepting all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true, the Court ‘consider[s] the factual allegations in [the] complaint to determine if they plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.’” *Williams v. Curtin*, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting *Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 681) (alteration in original). “[P]leadings that . . . are no more than conclusions[] are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.” *Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 679; *see also Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 555 n.3 (“Rule 8(a)(2) still requires a ‘showing,’ rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief. Without some factual allegation in the complaint, it is hard to see how a claimant could satisfy the requirement of providing not only ‘fair notice’ of the nature of the claim, but also ‘grounds’ on which the claim rests.”).

“Pro se complaints are to be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, and should therefore be liberally construed.” *Williams*, 631 F.3d at 383 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). *Pro se* litigants, however, are not exempt from the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. *Wells v. Brown*, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989); *see also Brown v. Matauszak*, 415 F. App’x 608, 613 (6th Cir. 2011) (“[A] court cannot create a claim which [a plaintiff] has not spelled out in his pleading”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); *Payne v. Sec’y of Treas.*, 73 F. App’x 836, 837 (6th Cir. 2003) (affirming *sua sponte* dismissal of complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) and stating, “[n]either this court nor the district court is required to create Payne’s claim for her”); *cf. Pliler v. Ford*, 542 U.S. 225, 231 (2004) (“District judges have no obligation to act as counsel or paralegal to pro se litigants.”);

*Young Bok Song v. Gipson*, 423 F. App'x 506, 510 (6th Cir. 2011) (“[W]e decline to affirmatively require courts to ferret out the strongest cause of action on behalf of pro se litigants. Not only would that duty be overly burdensome, it would transform the courts from neutral arbiters of disputes into advocates for a particular party. While courts are properly charged with protecting the rights of all who come before it, that responsibility does not encompass advising litigants as to what legal theories they should pursue.”).

## **II. Alleged Facts**

According to the complaint, on December 9, 2016, after the Plaintiff and Troy Lozano filed suit against the City of Clarksville, more than one unidentified “officers” forced the Plaintiff and Mr. Lozano out of the Plaintiff’s car and questioned the two men about the Plaintiff “calling threats [sic] to the Mayor’s office.” (Docket No. 1 at p. 2). The complaint alleges that the Plaintiff demanded that the officers produce a warrant. (*Id.*) The Plaintiff believes his Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated during this exchange. (*Id.* at p. 1).

## **III. Analysis**

In order to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must plead and prove that a defendant, while acting under color of state law, deprived him or her of some right or privilege secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. *Parratt v. Taylor*, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981).

First, the Plaintiff names Deputy Chief Gray, Darren Koski, and Bradley Holder as Defendants. It is a basic pleading essential that a plaintiff must attribute factual allegations to particular defendants. *See Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 544 (holding that, in order to state a claim, a plaintiff must make sufficient allegations to give a defendant fair notice of the claim). The Plaintiff has failed to attribute any conduct at all to Deputy Chief Gray. Similarly, although the complaint

alleges that “officers” forced the Plaintiff out of his vehicle and questioned the Plaintiff about threats to the mayor, the complaint does not identify the officers involved in the December 9, 2016, incident by name. Where a defendant is named but the plaintiff fails to allege that the defendant engaged in any specific conduct, the complaint is subject to dismissal, even under the liberal construction afforded to *pro se* complaints. *See Gilmore v. Corr. Corp. of Am.*, 92 F. App’x 188, 190 (6th Cir. 2004) (dismissing complaint where plaintiff failed to allege how any named defendant was involved in the violation of his rights). Therefore, the Plaintiff’s claims against Deputy Chief Gray, Darren, and Bradley will be dismissed.

Even assuming *arguendo* that the Plaintiff had identified Koski and Holder as the officers involved in the event, as relief for the alleged wrongs committed by the officers, the complaint seeks money damages from the officers in their official capacities only. (Docket No. 1 at p. 3). A suit against a police officer in his official capacity is a suit against the entity by whom the officer is employed. A fair reading of the instant *pro se* complaint is that officers Koski and Holder are employees of the City of Clarksville or the City’s police department

The Plaintiff has named the “City of Clarksville, Police Department” as a Defendant or as two separate Defendants to this action. However, the Clarksville Police Department is not a suable entity under § 1983. *See Mathes v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty.*, No. 3:10–cv–0496, 2010 WL 3341889, at \*2 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 25, 2010) (“[F]ederal district courts in Tennessee have frequently and uniformly held that police departments and sheriff’s departments are not proper parties to a § 1983 suit.”)(collecting cases)). Thus, the Plaintiff’s claims against the Clarksville Police Department must be dismissed.

While the City of Clarksville is a suable entity, it is responsible under § 1983 only for its “own illegal acts. [It is] not vicariously liable under § 1983 for [its] employees’ actions.” *Connick*

*v. Thompson*, 563 U.S. 51, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1359, 179 L.Ed.2d 417 (2011) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Under § 1983, a municipality can only be held liable if the plaintiff demonstrates that the alleged federal violation was a direct result of the city's official policy or custom. *Burgess v. Fisher*, 735 F.3d 462, 478 (6th Cir.2013) (citing *Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs.*, 436 U.S. 658, 693, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978)); *Regets v. City of Plymouth*, 568 Fed. Appx. 380, 2014 WL 2596562, at \*12 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting *Slusher v. Carson*, 540 F.3d 449, 456-57 (6th Cir. 2008)). A plaintiff can make a showing of an illegal policy or custom by demonstrating one of the following: (1) the existence of an illegal official policy or legislative enactment; (2) that an official with final decision making authority ratified illegal actions; (3) the existence of a policy of inadequate training or supervision; or (4) the existence of a custom or tolerance or acquiescence of federal rights violations. *Burgess*, 735 F.3d at 478.

The inadequacy of police training only serves as a basis for § 1983 liability where the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact. *Slusher*, 540 F.3d at 457. To establish deliberate indifference, the plaintiff may show prior instances of unconstitutional conduct demonstrating that the governmental entity has ignored a history of abuse and was clearly on notice that the training in this particular area was deficient and likely to cause injury. *Id.*; see also *Gregory v. City of Louisville*, 444 F.3d 725, 752-53 (6th Cir. 2006). In the alternative, where the constitutional violation was not alleged to be part of a pattern of past misconduct, a supervisory official or a municipality may be held liable only where there is essentially a complete failure to train the police force or training that is so reckless or grossly negligent that future police misconduct is almost inevitable or would properly be characterized as substantially certain to result. *Hays v. Jefferson Cnty., Ky.*, 668 F.2d 869, 874 (6th Cir.1982).

Here, the allegations of the complaint are insufficient to state a claim for municipal liability against the City of Clarksville under § 1983. The complaint does not identify or describe any of the City's policies, procedures, practices, or customs relating to training; it does not identify any particular shortcomings in that training or how those shortcomings caused the alleged violations of the plaintiff's rights; and it does not identify any other previous instances of similar violations that would have put the City of Clarksville on notice of a problem. *See Okolo v. Metropolitan Gov't of Nashville*, 892 F. Supp.2d 931, 944 (M.D. Tenn. 2012); *Hutchison v. Metropolitan Gov't of Nashville*, 685 F. Supp.2d 747, 751 (M.D. Tenn. 2010); *Johnson v. Metropolitan Gov't of Nashville*, No. 3:10-cv-0589, 2010 WL 3619790, at \*\*2-3 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 13, 2010). Accordingly, the Court finds that the complaint does not contain sufficient allegations to state a claim for municipal liability against the City of Clarksville. Any such claim will be dismissed.

Finally, in stating his grounds for filing this lawsuit, the Plaintiff cites 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242, alleging a "conspiracy against rights." (Docket No. 1 at p. 1). The Sixth Circuit has defined a civil conspiracy under 42 U.S.C § 1983 as follows:

A civil conspiracy is an agreement between two or more persons to injure another by unlawful action. Express agreement among all the conspirators is not necessary to find the existence of a civil conspiracy. Each conspirator need not know all of the details of the illegal plan or all of the participants involved. All that must be shown is that there is a single plan, that the alleged co-conspirator shared in the general conspiratorial objective, and that an overt act was committed in furtherance of the conspiracy that caused injury to the complainant.

*Hooks v. Hooks*, 771 F.2d 935, 943-44 (6<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1985). Conspiracy claims must be pled with a degree of specificity. *Hamilton v. City of Romulus*, 409 Fed. Appx. 826, 835-36 (6<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2010). Vague and conclusory allegations unsupported by material facts are insufficient, although circumstantial evidence of an agreement among all conspirators may provide adequate proof. *Id.*


As to the existence of a conspiracy to interrogate, detain, arrest or incarcerate the plaintiff, there are **no** allegations in the complaint, much less any allegations with the requisite specificity to sustain a civil conspiracy claim. Thus, the Plaintiff's civil conspiracy claims as to all Defendants will be dismissed.

#### **IV. Conclusion**

In conclusion, the Court finds that the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. This action, therefore, will be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).

For the same reasons that the Court dismisses this action, the Court finds that an appeal of this action would not be taken in good faith. The Court therefore certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that any appeal in this matter by the Plaintiff would not be taken in good faith, and the Plaintiff will not be granted leave by this Court to proceed on appeal *in forma pauperis*.

An appropriate order will enter.

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Kevin H. Sharp", is positioned above a horizontal line.

Kevin H. Sharp  
Chief United States District Judge